This Article Full Text (PDF) References Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via Google Scholar Citing Articles via Scopus Google Scholar Articles by Skog, O.-J. Search for Related Content Social Bookmarking                         What's this?

The Voting Paradox in Socially Integrated Populations

Department of Sociology, Stockholm University and National Institute for Alcohol and Drug Research, Oslo

The paper addresses the problem of aggregating individual choices between three discrete alternatives, and discusses how the likelihood of cyclical aggregate preferences under majority rule depends on social integration in large populations. It is argued that the so- called impartial culture condition gives rather limited information as to the likelihood of the paradox occurring, and an alternative model is outlined. Social structure is introduced, by imposing correlation between the first and second choices. The resulting structure may significantly reduce the likelihood of a cyclical outcome A measure of similarity between rankings is introduced, and this measure serves as a vehicle for discussing the effects of social integration on the distribution of the population across the six possible rankings of alternatives. It is concluded that integration significantly reduces the like lihood of a cyclical outcome.

Acta Sociologica, Vol. 36, No. 3, 207-222 (1993)
DOI: 10.1177/000169939303600305


CiteULike    Complore    Connotea    Del.icio.us    Digg    Reddit    Technorati    Twitter    What's this?